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Abstract
After generalizing the Archimedean property of real numbers in such
a way as to make it adaptable to non-numeric structures, we demon-
strate that the real numbers cannot be used to accurately measure non-
Archimedean structures. We argue that, since an agent with Artificial
General Intelligence (AGI) should have no problem engaging in tasks
that inherently involve non-Archimedean rewards, and since traditional
reinforcement learning rewards are real numbers, therefore traditional re-
inforcement learning cannot lead to AGI. We indicate two possible ways
traditional reinforcement learning could be altered to remove this road-
block.
1 Introduction
Whenever we measure anything using a particular number system, the corre-
sponding measurements will be constrained by the structure of that number
system. If the number system has a different structure than the things we are
measuring with it, then our measurements will suffer accordingly, just as if we
were trying to force square pegs into round holes.
For example, the natural numbers make lousy candidates for measuring
lengths in a physics laboratory. Lengths in the lab have properties such as,
for example, the fact that for any two distinct lengths, there is an intermediate
length strictly between them. The natural numbers lack this property. Imagine
the poor physicist, brought up in a world of only natural numbers, scratching
his or her head upon encountering a rod with length strictly between two rods
of length 1 and 2.
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It is tempting to think of the real numbers R—i.e., the unique complete
ordered field—as a generic number system with whatever structure suits our
needs. But the real numbers do have their own specific structure. That structure
is flexible enough to accomodate many needs, but we shouldn’t just take that for
granted. One particular property constraining the real numbers is the following.
Lemma 1. (The Archimedean Property1) Let r > 0 be any positive real num-
ber. For every real number y, there is some natural number n such that nr > y.
Rather than directly prove Lemma 1, we will prove a generalized result
which, we will argue, is more adaptable to other structures.
Lemma 2. (The Generalized Archimedean Property) Let r > 0 be any positive
real number. For any x, y ∈ R, say that x is significantly less than y if x ≤
y − r. If x0, x1, x2, . . . is any infinite sequence of real numbers, where each xi
is significantly less than xi+1, then for every real number y, there exists some i
such that y is significantly less than xi.
Proof. If not, then there is some y such that y + r > xi for all i. Thus, X =
{x0, x1, x2, . . .} has an upper bound. By the completeness of R, X must have a
least upper bound z ∈ R. Since z is the least upper bound for X , z − r is not
an upper bound for X , so there is some i such that xi > z − r. By assumption,
xi ≤ xi+1 − r, so xi+1 > z, contradicting the choice of z.
Lemma 1 follows from Lemma 2 by letting xi = ir.
The above property is automatically inherited by subsystems of the reals,
such as the rational numbers Q, the natural numbers N, the integers Z, or
the algebraic numbers. All inherit the Generalized Archimedean Property in
obvious ways.
Lemma 2 allows us to adapt the notion of Archimedeanness to other things
than real numbers, even to things for which there is no notion of arithmetic at
all (Lemma 1 would not adapt to such things). All we need is a notion of “sig-
nificantly greater than”. For any set of things, some of which are “significantly
1The Archimedean property is named after Archimedes of Syracuse. A similar property
appears as the fifth axiom in his On the Sphere and Cylinder [5]:
Further, of unequal lines, unequal surfaces, and unequal solids, the greater ex-
ceeds the less by such a magnitude as, when added to itself, can be made to
exceed any assigned magnitude among those which are comparable with [it and
with] one another.
Note that Archimedes specifically restricts his statement to lengths, surface areas and volumes,
in fact going out of his way to limit the magnitudes to which said length/area/volume can be
made to exceed (he could have saved some words by stopping his sentence at “...can be made
to exceed any assigned magnitude”, if that were his intention).
The Archimedean property is also closely related to Definition 4 of Book V of Euclid’s
Elements [12]:
(Those) magnitudes are said to have a ratio with respect to one another which,
being multiplied, are capable of exceeding one another.
Proposition 1 of Book X is also relevant. Many math historians speak of the modern-day
Archimedean property, Archimedes’ 5th axiom, and Euclid’s properties as being identical,
but in fact they are all subtly different from one another, see [6].
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greater than” others, we can ask whether or not the property in Lemma 2 holds.
We will make this formal in Section 2.
Example 3. (Fuzzy widgets) Suppose we have some fuzzy widgets, and we
observe that certain widgets are fuzzier than others. Naturally, we are inclined
to quantify the fuzziness of the widgets, assigning them numerical fuzziness
measures from some number system. Nine times out of ten, we choose to use
the real numbers, or a subsystem thereof, often without a second thought. But
suppose among these widgets, there happen to be widgets w1, w2, . . . such that
each wi is significantly less fuzzy than wi+1, and another widget w∞ such that
all the wi’s are significantly less fuzzy than w∞. Suddenly, our decision to use
real numbers puts us in a bind. It is impossible to assign real number fuzziness
measures to our widgets in such a way that significantly less fuzzy widgets get
significantly smaller real number measures. That would contradict Lemma 2.
Note that the above example does not require us to have any notion of mul-
tiplying fuzziness by a natural number n (as we would need to have if we wanted
to adapt Lemma 1). This illustrates the enhanced adaptability of Lemma 2.
The structure of this paper is as follows.
• In Section 2 we formally adapt Lemma 2 to obtain a notion of Archimedean-
ness for non-numerical structures, and demonstrate that non-Archimedean
such structures cannot accurately be measured using the real numbers.
• In Section 3 we argue that traditional reinforcement learning will not lead
to AGI because its rewards are overly constrained.
• In Section 4 we discuss non-traditional variations of reinforcement learning
that avoid the problem of overly constrained rewards.
• In Section 5 we summarize and make concluding remarks.
2 Generalized Archimedean Structures
The real numbers possess the Archimedean property, but other structures may
or may not. To make this more precise, we introduce the following formalism,
adapting from Lemma 2.
Definition 1. A significantly-ordered structure is a collection X with an order-
ing ≪. For x1, x2 ∈ X , we say x1 is significantly less than x2 if x1 ≪ x2. A
significantly-ordered structure is Archimedean if it has the following property:
for every X-sequence x0 ≪ x1 ≪ x2 ≪ · · · , for every x∞ ∈ X , there is some i
such that x∞ ≪ xi.
For any real number r > 0, a prototypical example of an Archimedean
significantly-ordered structure is the real numbers with ≪ defined such that
x≪ y if and only if x ≤ y − r.
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Definition 2. Suppose (X,≪) is a significantly-ordered structure. A function
f : X → R is said to accurately measure (X,≪) if there is some real r > 0 such
that the following requirement holds:
• For all x, y ∈ X , x≪ y if and only if f(x) ≤ f(y)− r.
The following proposition formalizes the dilemma we illustrated in Example
3 (think of X as a set of things we want to measure).
Proposition 4. (Inadequacy of the reals for non-Archimedean structures) Sup-
pose (X,≪) is a significantly-ordered structure. If X is non-Archimedean, then
no function f : X → R accurately measures (X,≪).
Proof. Assume, for sake of a contradiction, that some f : X → R exists which
accurately measures (X,≪). Thus there is some real r > 0 such that for all
x, y ∈ X , x ≪ y if and only if f(x) ≤ f(y) − r. Since X is non-Archimedean,
there is some X-sequence x0 ≪ x1 ≪ x2 ≪ · · · and some x∞ ∈ X such that
there is no i such that x∞ ≪ xi. By choice of r, each f(xi) ≤ f(xi+1)− r and
there is no i such that f(x∞) ≤ f(xi)− r. This contradicts Lemma 2.
Proposition 4 tells us that we cannot accurately measure non-Archimedean
structures using real numbers2. Any attempt to do so will necessarily be mis-
leading, because ordering relationships among the non-Archimedean structures
will fail to be reflected by the real-number measurements given to them. We
will inevitably end up like the puzzled physicist brought up in a world of only
natural numbers, confronted by a rod of length 1.5.
Remark 5. (Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns) Suppose (X,≪) is a
non-Archimedean significantly-ordered structure with elements x0, x1, . . . and
x∞ such that x0 ≪ x1 ≪ · · · and each xi ≪ x∞. Suppose f : X → R
has the property that f(x0) < f(x1) < · · · and each f(xi) < f(x∞). Then
the monotone convergence theorem implies that limi→∞ f(xi) converges, which
in turn implies that limi→∞(f(xi+1) − f(xi)) = 0. This suggests a general
law of diminishing returns : any time a non-Archimedean significantly-ordered
structure (X,≪) is measured using real numbers, if the measurement does not
blatantly violate ≪ (in other words, if there are no x≪ y such that x is given
a larger real-number measurement than y), then there will inevitably be ele-
ments x0 ≪ x1 ≪ · · · exhibiting diminishing returns, in the sense that the
measurements of xi and xj are approximately equal for large i, j. If human
intelligence is non-Archimedean, this could potentially shed light on a psycho-
metrical phenomenon called Spearman’s Law of Diminishing Returns [29] [8]
[13], the empirical tendency of cognitive ability tests to be less correlated in
high-intelligence populations. Even tiny measurement errors would eventually
dominate the test result differences as the true results plateau.
2There is an area of research known as measurement theory, which, traditionally, “takes the
real numbers as a pre-given numerical domain” [20]. Some work has been done to generalize
measurement theory away from this assumption [19] [28] [25]. We would submit this paper as
further motivation in that direction.
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Example 6. (Examples of non-Archimedean structures)
• (Sets) Say that set U is significantly smaller than set V if there is an
injective function from U into V but there is no bijective function from
U onto V . It is easy to show there are sets U0, U1, . . ., with each Ui
significantly smaller than Ui+1, and each Ui is significantly smaller than
U∞ = ∪
∞
i=0Ui. Thus, sets are non-Archimedean. In the field of set theory,
mathematicians measure the size of sets using Georg Cantor’s famous non-
Archimedean number system, the cardinal numbers.
• (Logical theories) It is not difficult to come up with (for example) true
theories T0, T1, . . . (in the language of arithmetic) such that each Ti+1
proves the consistency of Ti, and an additional true theory T∞ (in the
language of arithmetic) which proves the consistency of ∪∞i=0Ti. In a sense,
then, each Ti is significantly weaker than Ti+1 (see Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorems), and each Ti is significantly weaker than T∞. In this sense,
logical theories are non-Archimedean. In the field of proof theory [22] [23],
logicians measure the logical strength of theories using computable ordinal
numbers, another non-Archimedean number system.
• (Asymptotic runtime complexities) SupposeA0, A1, . . . are algorithms such
that each Ai has runtime complexity Θ(n
i), and suppose A∞ is an algo-
rithm with runtime complexity Θ(2n). Then in a certain sense, eachAi has
significantly lower asymptotic runtime complexity than Ai+1, and each Ai
has significantly lower asymptotic runtime complexity than A∞. In this
sense, asymptotic runtime complexity is non-Archimedean. In computer
science, these runtime complexities are usually measured using big-O, big-
Θ, or similar notation systems.
Example 7. (Speculative examples of potentially non-Archimedean structures)
Certain structures might plausibly be non-Archimedean, but it is a difficult
question to say whether they truly are or not. The reader could come up with
such examples in great abundance.
• (Musical beauty) Assuming there is such a thing as objective musical
beauty (not contingent on features of the human condition, etc.), then
it is plausible that music might be non-Archimedean, in the following
sense: there might be songs S0, S1, . . . such that each Si is significantly less
beautiful than Si+1, and another song S∞ such that each Si is significantly
less beautiful than S∞.
• (Ethical utility) Early utilitarian Jeremy Bentham suggested a hedonistic
calculus in which pleasure measurements would be assigned to actions,
to help adjudicate ethical dilemmas. His successor, John Stuart Mill,
objected that some actions are incomparably better than others: “If one
of [two pleasures] is, by those who are competently acquainted with both,
placed so far above the other that they prefer it ... and would not resign
it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable
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of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority
in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison,
of small account” [18]. This suggests that Bentham’s pleasures are non-
Archimedean.
• (AGI) It is plausible that there are3 AGIs A0, A1, . . . such that each Ai
is significantly less intelligent than Ai+1, and another AGI A∞ such that
each Ai is significantly less intelligent than A∞. We first pointed this out
in [3], where we propose measuring the intelligence of mechanical know-
ing agents using computable ordinals, the same non-Archimedean number
system which proof theorists use to measure logical strength of mathemat-
ical theories. Incidentally, if AGI intelligence is non-Archimedean, then
Proposition 4 shows it is impossible to measure machine intelligence using
real numbers without some of those measurements being misleading4.
• (Nonstandard cosmologies) Some authors [1] [4] [24] [27] [9] have even
speculated about the nature of non-Archimedean space and/or time.
3 Reinforcement learning
In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent interacts with an environment, taking
actions from a fixed set of possible actions. With every action the agent takes,
the environment responds with a new observation and with a reward. In tra-
ditional RL, these rewards are real numbers (many authors further constrain
them to be rational numbers).
By restricting rewards to be real (or rational) numbers, we unconsciously
constrain RL to only be applicable toward tasks of an inherently Archimedean
nature. For example, Wirth et al point out [33] that in tasks related to cancer
treatment [34], “the death of a patient should be avoided at any cost. However,
an infinitely negative reward breaks classic reinforcement learning algorithms
and arbitrary, finite values have to be selected.” This problem could be avoided
if instead of real numbers, rewards were drawn from a suitable non-Archimedean
number system containing negative infinities. Doing so would be a departure
from traditional RL.
Example 8. To give an intuitive example, assume that musical beauty is non-
Archimedean, as in Example 7. We can imagine environments where the RL
agent is tasked with composing songs. For example, the possible actions the
3As hinted by Protagoras, assuming Protagoras’s own intelligence stays constant and re-
mains higher than the intelligence of his student and that they live forever and that better
means significantly better : “The very day you start, you will go home a better man, and
the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day, you will get better and
better.” [21]
4This would solve an open problem implicitly stated by Legg and Hutter [16] when they
said of their real-number universal intelligence measure: “...none of these people have been
able to communicate why the work [on measuring universal intelligence using real numbers]
is so obviously flawed in any concrete way ... If anyone would like to properly explain their
position to us in the future, we promise not to chase you down the street!”
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agent is allowed to take might include one action for each piano key, plus an
additional “stand and bow” action to signal that a song is finished. Whenever
the agent stands and bows, the agent is rewarded with applause based on the
beauty of the song the agent composed5. Assuming musical beauty is non-
Archimedean, such an environment falls outside the possibility of traditional RL.
By Lemma 4, there is no way to assign real number rewards to songs without
misleading the agent. If S0, S1, S2, . . . are songs where each Si is significantly less
beautiful than Si+1, and all the Si are significantly less beautiful than another
song S∞, then there is no way to assign real-valued rewards to these songs such
that each Si gets significantly less reward than Si+1 and significantly less reward
than S∞.
Or, to re-use the cancer example, assume there are certain bad procedures
the robotic surgeon could take, each one significantly worse than the previous,
but all still significantly better than killing the patient. There is no way to
assign real-valued rewards to these actions, and to killing the patient, in such a
way that each bad action gets punished significantly harsher than the previous,
but still significantly more forgiving than the punishment for killing the patient.
The reader might object by challenging the non-Archimedeanness of music
and of medical procedures. But we only used those to make the examples more
intuitive. If the reader insists, we can resort to mathematical tasks.
Example 9. Imagine that the agent is tasked with typing up mathematical
theories, and when the agent stands and bows, the agent is rewarded with ap-
plause based on the proof-theoretical strength of the theory (or hit with toma-
toes if the theory is inconsistent). In Example 6 we noted that proof-theoretical
strength of theories is non-Archimedean. There exist theories T0, T1, . . ., each
significantly proof-theoretically weaker than the next, and another theory T∞,
significantly proof-theoretically stronger than all the Ti’s. We cannot possibly
assign real-valued rewards to these theories without misleading the agent.
The reader might object to Example 9 on the grounds that judging the
proof-theoretical strength of a theory is inherently non-computable anyway.
The example could be modified so that instead of typing up mathematical the-
ories, the agent has to type up mathematical subtheories in (say) the language
of Peano arithmetic, accompanied by consistency proofs in (say) ZFC. It can
be shown that the proof-theoretical strength of mathematical theories is still
non-Archimedean, even when restricted to subtheories of arithmetic whose con-
sistency can be proven in ZFC6.
5To quote Wang and Hammer: “Decision makings often do not happen at the level of basic
operations, but at the level of composed actions, where there are usually infinite possibilities.”
[32]
6For example, let T0 be the theory of Peano arithmetic, and for each i, let Ti+1 be Ti
together with CON(Ti), a canonical axiom encoding the consistency of Ti. Let T∞ be the
theory of Peano arithmetic along with CON(∪iTi). ZFC is certainly adequate to prove the
consistency of each of these theories. In the sense of Example 6, each Ti is significantly weaker
than Ti+1 and significantly weaker than T∞.
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The reader might object that the above theories-with-proofs example is con-
trived. But an AGI with human or better intelligence should have no problem at
least comprehending and attempting such a task (regardless of whether or not
the AGI is able to perform well at it). When we prove that the Halting Problem
is unsolvable, we do so by considering contrived programs that we could write if
the Halting Problem were solvable. The contrivedness of those programs does
not invalidate the proof of the unsolvability of the Halting Problem. Again,
when we prove that C++ templates are Turing complete [31], we do so by con-
sidering extremely bizarre C++ templates that would never arise naturally in
a software studio. This does not invalidate the proof that C++ templates are
Turing complete.
Finally, the reader might object that approximating infinite rewards with ar-
bitrary large finite rewards is good enough. Who cares (the argument might go)
whether pushing a button gives the agent infinite pleasure or only a million units
of pleasure? Either way (the argument goes) the agent is going to learn to prefer
that button over a button that gives only .1 units of pleasure. The following
example shows that this logic breaks down in non-Markov environments.
Example 10. (Delayed gratification) Consider an environment with a red but-
ton and a blue button. Pushing the red button always grants +1 reward. As
for the blue button, suppose the agent presses the blue button for the ith time.
If i = 2j for some integer j, then the agent shall receive a reward of ω (the
smallest infinite ordinal), but otherwise, the agent shall receive 0 reward. If we
approximate ω with a real-value of, say, 1, 000, 000, then after a long enough
time spent in the environment, an AGI will be misled into thinking that it isn’t
worth the longer and longer wait-times between blue-button rewards: eventu-
ally, it will take more than 1, 000, 000 blue-button-presses to get rewarded, and
the AGI will consider it more worthwhile to get the guaranteed +1 reward from
the red button.
Our critic could respond to Example 10 by making the approximation dy-
namic, say, making the 2jth press of the blue button grant 1000000 · 2j reward,
but at this point, the critic is clearly just hard-coding the correct actions into
the reward function, something which is only possible in Example 10 because
the environment is simple enough that we can completely understand it our-
selves. For the kinds of non-trivial environments where AGI would actually be
useful, such carefully engineered reward approximations would quickly become
intractible.
Reinforcement Learning is useful for many practical tasks, but at least in
its traditional flavor, it is too constrained (by its arbitrary choice of number
system for its rewards) to apply to certain non-Archimedean tasks7, which,
however contrived they are, could certainly be attempted by an AGI. Traditional
reinforcement learning will not lead to AGI.
7Perhaps explaining why “despite almost two decades of RL research, there has been little
solid evidence of RL systems that may one day lead to [AGI]” [17].
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4 Non-traditional reinforcement learning
We have argued that traditional RL cannot lead to AGI, because an AGI is
capable of attempting non-Archimedean tasks whose rewards are too rich to
express using real numbers. There are at least two potential ways to change RL
so as to make it applicable to such tasks and, thus, at least potentially capable
of leading to AGI. Of course, there is no guarantee that removing the roadblock
in this paper will cause RL to lead to AGI. There might be other roadblocks
besides the inadequate reward number system8.
4.1 Preference-based reinforcement learning
A lot of exciting research has been done on non-traditional variations of RL
where, instead of giving the agent numerical rewards for taking actions, one
instead informs the agent about the relative preference of various actions or
action-sequences. See [33] for a survey. This very nicely side-steps the problems
from this paper.
4.2 Reinforcement learning with other number systems
The most obvious way to modify RL to avoid the problems presented in this
paper is to change which number system is used9. As far as this author is aware,
the choice to use real (or rational) numbers for rewards was not made based
on any fundamental criteria10. The real (or rational) numbers are currently
a useful pragmatic choice because they are easy to compute with using 21st
century software and 21st century school curricula, but that’s hardly relevant
in the field of genuine AGI. One might say the real numbers were a good choice
because they are familiar, but even that is arguable: in general, students are
usually not taught what the real numbers actually are, unless they major in
pure mathematics at the university level. Anyway, the familiarity argument is
totally irrelevant in the field of AGI.
Various non-Archimedean number systems exist. Number systems can be
discrete or continuous; the nature of reinforcement learning clearly suggests a
continuous number system. We will consider three possible number systems:
formal Laurent series; hyperreal numbers; and surreal numbers.
8For example, many RL authors consider non-deterministic environments where rewards
and observations include an element of randomness. The probabilities involved are, tradi-
tionally, assumed to be real numbers. Perhaps some recent work [7] on non-Archimedean
probability could be relevant against that roadblock.
9Anticipated by [25].
10Niedere´e points out [20] that there are no deeper reasons to assume that the number
system should necessarily even have the same cardinality as R. And Rizza says [25]: “No
particular feature of the space of informational states suggests that such a codomain [as R]
should be selected”.
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4.2.1 Formal Laurent series
David Tall described [30] the following real-number-extending number system
(which he called the “superreals”, but that vocabulary does not seem to have
caught on).
Definition 3. A formal Laurent series is a formal expression of the following
form (where m can be any integer and a−m, a−(m−1), . . . , a0, a1, a2, . . . are real
numbers, a−m 6= 0):
∞∑
i=−m
aiǫ
i.
Suppose A =
∑
∞
i=−m aiǫ
i and B =
∑
∞
i=−n biǫ
i are two distinct formal Laurent
series. We declare A < B if and only if ai < bi where i is the smallest index
such that ai 6= bi (where we consider ai to be 0 for all i < −m and we consider
bi to be 0 for all i < −n).
We can consider the real numbers R to be embedded in the formal Laurent
series by way of the embedding r 7→ rǫ0. Having done so, the intuition is that, for
example, 1ǫ1 is what we might call a “first-order infinitesimal number”, smaller
than every positive real; 1ǫ2 is what we might call a “second-order infinitesimal
number”, smaller than every positive first-order infinitesimal number; and so on.
Likewise, 1ǫ−1 is what we might call a “first-order infinite number”, bigger than
every real; 1ǫ−2 is what we might call a “second-order infinite number”, bigger
than every first-order infinite number; and so on. Thus, the formal Laurent
series are quite adequate to address the specific problem described by Wirth et
al [33] in which an infinite negative reward is required when the RL agent kills
the cancer patient.
There are natural ways to define arithmetic on formal Laurent series, but
we will avoid those details here. The advantage of the formal Laurent series
number system is that it is relatively concrete, compared to the more abstract
hyperreal or surreal numbers discussed below.
Example 11. (Examples of formal Laurent series comparisons)
1. Consider A = 5ǫ−1− 2ǫ0+3ǫ1+4ǫ2 and B = 5ǫ−1− 2ǫ0+1ǫ1+4ǫ2+5ǫ6.
The ǫ−1- and ǫ0-coefficients of A and B are equal, so we compare their
ǫ1-coefficients. A has an ǫ1-coefficient of 3 and B has an ǫ1-coefficient of
1, and 3 > 1, so A > B.
2. Consider A = 999999ǫ5 and B = 0.00001ǫ4. We consider A to have an
ǫ4-coefficient of 0, which is smaller than B’s ǫ4-coefficient (0.00001), so
A < B.
There is a natural way to consider formal Laurent series as a significantly-
ordered structure, generalizing the notion of “significantly greater than” from
Lemma 2.
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Definition 4. 1. For every Laurent series A =
∑
∞
i=−m aiǫ
i, let o(A) = −m
(call this the order of A), and let LC(A) be the ǫo(A)-coefficient of A (call
this the leading coefficient of A).
2. Let r > 0 be any positive real number. For any formal Laurent series
A =
∑
∞
i=−m aiǫ
i and B =
∑
∞
i=−n biǫ
i, we say A ≪r B if one of the
following conditions holds:
• o(A) > o(B) and LC(B) > 0; or
• o(A) < o(B) and LC(A) < 0; or
• o(A) = o(B) and LC(A) ≤ LC(B)− r.
Lemma 12. For any real r > 0, the formal Laurent series, considered as a
significantly-ordered structure according to ≪r, are non-Archimedean.
Proof. Let x0 = 0ǫ
1, x1 = rǫ
1, x2 = 2rǫ
1, and in general let xi = irǫ
1. Let
x∞ = 1ǫ
0. Then each xi ≪r xi+1, and yet each xi ≪r x∞.
Unfortunately, although the formal Laurent series contain infinities and in-
finitesimals, in a sense we will make formal, they still do not contain “enough”
infinities and infinitesimals to accomodate genuine AGI. To make this formal,
we introduce a weaker notion of Archimedeanness.
Definition 5. Suppose (X,≪) is a significantly-ordered structure. We define
a new order ≪′ on X as follows. For any x, y ∈ X , we declare x ≪′ y if and
only if there is a sequence x0, x1, . . . such that the following conditions hold:
1. x0 = x.
2. Each xi ≪ xi+1.
3. Each xi ≪ y.
We say (X,≪) is 2-Archimedean if (X,≪′) is Archimedean.
Proposition 13. For any real r > 0, the formal Laurent series are 2-Archimedean
when considered as a significantly-ordered structure as in Definition 4.
We omit the proof of Proposition 13 because it is somewhat tedious and we
do not need it anywhere later in the paper. It merely serves to explain why
formal Laurent series are still not good enough to avoid the AGI roadblock
from this paper. Just as we argued that a genuine AGI should be capable of
engaging in tasks that involve inherently non-Archimedean rewards, by similar
reasoning, an AGI should be capable of engaging in tasks that involve inherently
non-2-Archimedean rewards. It is not hard to show that all the structures in
Example 6 are non-2-Archimedean. Thus, replacing real number rewards by
formal Laurent series rewards is not enough to remove the roadblock, but it
would at least expand the types of rewards which are possible.
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4.2.2 Hyperreal numbers
The field of mathematics where the calculus is formalized with infinite and
infinitesimal quantities is called nonstandard analysis [26]. The numbers most
commonly associated with this field are the so-called hyperreal numbers.
The hyperreal numbers can be introduced axiomatically or by means of a
semi-constructive method which depends on usage of a certain black box, a
device known as a free ultrafilter. Logicians have proven that free ultrafilters
exist but that, unfortunately, it is impossible to concretely exhibit one. This
severely limits (if not completely ruins) the practical usefulness of reinforcement
learning with hyperreal rewards.
Nevertheless, the hyperreals might be useful for proving abstract struc-
tural properties about AGI11. It can be shown that the hyperreals are not
2-Archimedean, and indeed, not α-Archimedean for any ordinal α, where “α-
Archimedean” refers to a certain natural weakening of 2-Archimedeanness. Thus,
for the purpose of proving abstract theorems about RL agents with generalized
rewards, the hyperreals would be more appropriate than the formal Laurent
series.
4.2.3 Surreal numbers
All of the well-known non-Archimedean extensions of R (including formal Lau-
rent series and hyperreals) are subsystems of the so-called surreal numbers [10]
[15] [11]. The surreal numbers were initially discovered during John Conway’s
attempts to study two-player combinatorial games like Go and Chess, so it would
not be surprising if they turn out to be important in the eventual development
of AGI.
Unlike the hyperreals, the construction of the surreal numbers does not
depend on any non-constructive black boxes such as free ultrafilters. They are
constructed as the union of a hierarchy Sα of subsystems where α ranges over
the ordinal numbers. Assuming that agents with AGI are implemented using
computers with no additional power beyond the Church-Turing Thesis, then
for the purposes of AGI, it would be appropriate to restrict our attention to
some computable subset of the surreal numbers, which would presumably be
the union of some hierarchy Cα where α ranges over the computable ordinal
numbers. For any particular level Cα in this hierarchy, we could consider the
sub-universe Eα of surreal-reward RL environments with rewards restricted to
Cα.
Assuming AGI agents are Turing computable, no individual AGI can pos-
sibly comprehend codes for all computable ordinals, because the set of codes
of computable ordinals is badly non-computably-enumerable. This is profound,
because it seems to suggest that any particular AGI can only comprehend RL
11Similar to the way we use free ultrafilters in [2] to obtain comparators of the utility-
maximizing ability of traditional deterministic RL agents, and prove structural properties
about said comparators. In fact, in that paper, we essentially independently re-invented the
free ultrafilter construction of the hyperreals, without realizing it at the time!
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environments in Eα if that AGI can comprehend α. In other words, for any par-
ticular RL environment e with computable surreal number rewards, there must
be some minimal computable ordinal α such that e has rewards from Eα; if an
AGI is not intelligent enough to comprehend α, then it seems like there should
be no way for the AGI to comprehend e either12. We would submit this state of
affairs as strong evidence in favor of our thesis [3] that a machine’s intelligence
ought to be measured in terms of the computable ordinals which the machine
comprehends.
The above paragraph points at a possible joint path toward AGI incor-
porating both machine learning and symbolic logic, perhaps a much-needed
reconciliation of these two approaches.
4.3 Alternate number systems: tentative verdict
For many simple environments not too far outside of traditional RL, formal
Laurent series could probably serve as a fairly practical number system. But
formal Laurent series have limitations which suggest that RL with formal Lau-
rent series rewards will not be enough to reach AGI, for the exact same reason
that RL with real number rewards will not be enough.
Because of their dependence on free ultrafilters, the hyperreal numbers will
probably never be of practical use as RL rewards, but it could conceivably be
possible to use them to prove abstract structural results about AGI from a
bird’s-eye view.
The surreal numbers (or a computable subset thereof) seem like the most
promising candidate for RL rewards that could plausibly lead to AGI. We would
certainly hesitate to call them “practical”, though. To work with any but the
most trivial of surreal numbers, one would need to implement sophisticated
symbolic-logical machinery, and that’s just to get one’s foot in the door. This
does, however, offer a ray of hope in the sense that doing deep learning tech-
niques with surreal numbers would be a way to combine both symbolic logic
and statistical methods into a joint approach.
5 Conclusion
In traditional reinforcement learning, utility-maximizing agents interact with en-
vironments, receiving real (or rational) number rewards in response to actions,
and using those rewards to update their behavior. We have argued that the de-
cision to limit rewards to real numbers is inappropriate in the context of AGI,
because the real numbers have the Archimedean property, which makes it impos-
sible to use them to accurately portray the value of actions when a task involves
inherently non-Archimedean rewards. Thus, we argue, traditional RL cannot
possibly lead to AGI, because a genuine AGI should have no trouble compre-
hending and at least attempting tasks that inherently involve non-Archimedean
rewards. We suggested two possible ways to modify traditional reinforcement
12This situation is highly reminiscent of [14].
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learning to fix this bug: switch to preference-based reinforcement learning, or
else generalize reinforcement learning to allow rewards from a non-Archimedean
number system.
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